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INTRODUCTION 
In the early days of our nation’s history, Chief Justice John 
Marshall articulated two principles that form the core of a growing 
debate regarding international human rights litigation.  The first was 
argued before the House of Representatives in 1800.  “The 
President,” Marshall said, “is the sole organ of the nation in its 
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”1  
The second principle came three years later in the Chief Justice’s 
infamous Marbury v. Madison opinion.  He wrote, “It is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is.”2  In a simpler world these ideas regarding the separation of 
powers would be mutually exclusive: international diplomacy on the 
one hand and domestic jurisprudence on the other.  However, in the 
real world, the two spheres of government collide, begging the 
question: what role is there for the courts in announcing and applying 
the law when that law affects the nation’s external relations?  Further, 
in the realm of international human rights litigation, where cases of 
torture scream out for justice, when is it appropriate for the courts to 
defer to Executive authority?  How much deference should the courts 
give when the President, through the Department of State and the 
Department of Justice, announces that foreign policy concerns trump 
those of the private litigants?  Though “it is error to suppose that 
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond 
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 1. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (citing 10 ANNALS 
OF CONG. 613 (1800)). 
 2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).  
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judicial cognizance,”3 a balance must be achieved between the 
concerns of the Executive and those of the litigants when those 
concerns are properly put before the court. 
There are few areas in American jurisprudence where these 
issues are clearer than in the Alien Tort Statute (or Alien Tort Claims 
Act) (ATS) litigation that has come before the federal courts over the 
past twenty-seven years.  Interestingly, the Alien Tort Statute was 
drafted nearly two hundred years before its recent ascent to the legal 
spotlight.  The statute was passed with the Judiciary Act of 1789, and 
as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1350, it states: “The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”4  In 1980 the seminal Second Circuit decision in Filártiga v. 
Peña-Irala breathed new life into the ATS and initiated a series of 
cases in which the lower courts applied Filártiga’s principles to human 
rights claims arising under the law of nations (now known as 
customary international law).5  These cases were affirmed, though to 
what extent is ambiguous, in the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision:  
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.6  Thus, Filártiga represented an important 
step in the realm of international human rights litigation.  Its progeny 
represent an outlet through which plaintiffs, though aliens in this 
country, can use the federal judicial system to seek reprieve for 
human rights abuses committed against them abroad. 
Most recently, a series of cases has been filed in district courts 
across the country alleging, inter alia, torture committed against 
plaintiffs in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).7  Under Filártiga 
and Sosa, it is clear that torture violates customary international law, 
and that, as such, torture is actionable under the jurisdiction of the 
ATS.8  However, aside from the plaintiffs, defendants, and courts, the 
Executive Branch is a vital player in this litigation.  The State 
Department has become involved in many of these cases, voicing its 
statements of interest and suggestions of immunity on behalf of the 
Chinese officials. 
 
 3. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).  
 4. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
 5. 630 F.2d 876, 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 6. 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004). 
 7. See Jacques DeLisle, Human Rights, Civil Wrongs and Foreign Relations: A “Sinical” 
Look at the Use of U.S. Litigation to Address Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 52 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 473, 473–76 (2002); Emma Schwartz, Siding with the Dragon, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 7, 2006. 
 8. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 884; see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 723-28. 
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The question is, therefore, how much deference should the 
courts give the Executive Branch in ATS human rights litigation.  The 
cases involving Chinese officials are particularly important due to the 
diplomatic dynamic between the United States and the PRC.  The 
cases, thus, present an interesting backdrop against which to address 
this question.  Ultimately, the decision to defer to the Executive 
Branch in cases involving torture and other gross violations of human 
rights is best made by courts applying a uniform standard.  By 
analyzing Supreme Court, lower court, and congressional guidance, 
and addressing the concerns surrounding too much and too little 
executive deference, such a uniform standard that brings balance to 
the system is conceivable. 
I.  ATS HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION: FILÁRTIGA TO SOSA 
On March 29, 1976, Joelito Filártiga, the son of a Paraguayan 
physician Dr. Joel Filártiga, was kidnapped from his house in 
Asuncion and tortured to death.9  The kidnapper was the Inspector 
General of Police, Americo Peña-Irala, and though it is unclear why 
he took the seventeen year old, the kidnapping was alleged an act of 
retaliation against the boy’s father.10  Dr. Filártiga was an admitted 
opponent of the dictator General Alfredo Stroessner, who had seized 
power in Paraguay in 1954.11  Along with having founded and run the 
“largest private health clinic for the poor in Paraguay,” Dr. Filártiga 
had gained international renown for his artwork, which depicted the 
extreme suffering of the Paraguayan people due to the inadequacy of 
the government.12  The torture of his son took place at the police 
station over the course of one and a half hours.  During that time the 
boy was whipped, slashed, and subjected to electric shocks.13  Joelito 
died of cardiac arrest due to the frequency and intensity of the 
shocks.14 
 
 9. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
 10. See Richard Pierre Claude, The Case of Joelito Filártiga and the Clinic of Hope, 5 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 275, 275-301, 283-84 (1983).  It is likely Peña hoped to obtain incriminating information 
on Dr. Filártiga. Id. 
 11. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878; Diana Jean Schemo, Gen. Alfredo Stroessner, Ruled Paraguay 
Through Fear for 35 Years, Dies in Exile at 93, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2006, at B7. 
 12. Claude, supra note 10, at 280-82. 
 13. Id. at 284. 
 14. Id. 
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The Filártigas’ efforts to find reprieve through the Paraguayan 
judicial system were met with threats and ultimately denied.15  As the 
Filártigas stated in their complaint against Peña, filed on April 6, 1979 
in the Eastern District of New York, “no relief can be obtained [in 
Paraguay], as the Paraguayan judiciary is an appendage of the 
executive branch.”16  Regardless, public sympathy for the family was 
widespread.17  Two thousand people attended the boy’s funeral and 
an art exhibit displaying Dr. Filártiga’s work was held at the 
Paraguayan-American cultural center.  It was sponsored by the U.S. 
Embassy and dedicated to Joelito.18 
On July 21, 1978, Peña entered the United States on a visitor’s 
visa, having been “retired” by Stroessner, who had succumbed to 
international pressure after the murder.19  Joelito’s sister Dolly 
Filártiga, who was seeking asylum in the United States, became aware 
of Peña’s presence in the country and, when he was arrested by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Services for overstaying his visa, 
promptly had him served with a complaint under the Alien Tort 
Statute § 1350.20  On July 30, 1980, the Second Circuit held that 
“deliberate torture perpetrated under the color of official authority 
violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human 
rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties.  Thus, whenever an 
alleged torturer is found and served with process by an alien within 
our borders, § 1350 provides federal jurisdiction.”21 
As noted above, § 1350 states, “The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”22  The district court in Filártiga found that it lacked 
jurisdiction under § 1350 because it interpreted “‘the law of 
nations’ . . . as excluding that law which governs a state’s treatment of 
its own citizens.”23  Thus, on appeal, the Second Circuit set out to 
review the threshold question of jurisdiction and, specifically, whether 
 
 15. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878; Claude, supra note 10, at 285. 
 16. Complaint at 18, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 97 Civ. 917), 
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diana/filartiga/13june.html. 
 17. See Claude, supra note 10, at 285-86. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 286. 
 20. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878-79; Claude, supra note 10, at 286-87. 
 21. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
 22. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 23. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 880. 
04__CLARENS.DOC 10/4/2007  9:53:56 AM 
2007] DEFERENCE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 419 
the torture of Joelito violated the law of nations.24  To aid in making 
its decision, the court requested the opinion of the Executive 
Branch.25  The memorandum from the Department of State and 
Department of Justice responding to this request stated two main 
points.  First, the Alien Tort Statute is not static, but “encompasses 
international law as it has evolved over time.”26  As such, “today a 
nation has an obligation under international law to respect the right 
of its citizens to be free of official torture.”27  Second, it rejects the 
idea that “only states, not individuals, could seek to enforce rules of 
international law.”28  In this way, in cases such as this one, where there 
is a wrong that is “both clearly defined and universally condemned . . . 
private enforcement is entirely appropriate.”29 
In its opinion, the court looks at all the implications of finding 
that official torture violated the law of nations.  The court lists the 
various sources of international law, including “works of jurists[,] . . . 
general usage and practice of nations [and] . . . judicial decisions,”30  
and acknowledges that international law does evolve over time.31  The 
court, though, sets a high standard for determining what qualifies as 
the law of nations.  It examines the various sources, particularly the 
United Nations Charter, U.N. declarations, international treaties and 
accords, and national law, and notes not only the widespread 
acceptance of torture as a violation of the international law, but also 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090), 1980 WL 340146, at *1. 
 26. Id. at *3. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at *20. 
 29. Id. at *23. 
 30. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-
61). 
 31. The court cites for both points The Paquete Habana, which states that 
Where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive act or judicial decision, resort 
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, 
to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and 
experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of 
which they treat.  Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the 
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy 
evidence of what the law really is. 
175 U.S. 677 at 700 (1900) (quoted in Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 880-81).  The Paquete Habana 
involved the seizure of a Spanish fishing vessel during the Spanish-American War.  The Court 
held that the proscription of such seizures had, over time, become international law “by the 
general consent of the civilized nations of the world, and independently of any express treaty or 
other public act.”  Id. 
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the lack of dissent against that general view.32  It concludes that “[t]he 
prohibition [of official torture] is clear and unambiguous, and admits 
no distinction between treatment of aliens and citizens.”33  Of further 
importance, the court makes clear that the international law is part of 
the federal common law.  It acknowledges that historically, “[d]uring 
the eighteenth century, it was taken for granted . . . that the law of 
nations forms a part of the common law,”34 and cites The Paquete 
Habana, stating that “international law is part of our law.”35  This 
historical analysis was crucial to validating the Alien Tort Statute 
under Article III of the Constitution, which grants federal courts the 
power to hear cases “arising under . . . the laws of the United States.” 
These laws include both statute and federal common law.36 
Filártiga was a watershed for international human rights 
adjudication in the federal courts.  A few cases decided between 
Filártiga and Sosa are illustrative.  Amongst these were a series of 
cases, consolidated in In re: Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human 
Rights Litigation (Marcos I), filed in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
against former Filipino president Ferdinand Marcos and his daughter 
Imee Marcos-Manotoc for torture and wrongful death.37  As these 
cases were the first time the Executive Branch had announced its 
position in an ATS case since Filártiga, the court addressed 
Executive’s position directly.  The court recognized the flip in the 
opinion of the Department of Justice between its expansive reading 
of the Alien Tort Statute in Filártiga and its far more narrow reading 
in its Marcos I amicus brief, and found that the Executive Branch’s 
“change of position in different cases and by different administrations 
is not a definitive statement by which [the courts] are bound on the 
limits of § 1350.”38  The court proceeds to find that torture, a violation 
 
 32. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 881-84. 
 33. Id. at 884. 
 34. Id. at 886. 
 35. Id. at 887 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700). 
 36. Id. at 886 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2). 
 37. The procedural history of the Marcos litigation is explained in In re Estate of Ferdinand 
Marcos Human Rights Litigation (Marcos II), 25 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that 
various lawsuits were filed in 1986, shortly after Marcos and his supporters fled to Hawaii, that 
though the district courts dismissed the actions based on the “act of state” doctrine, they were  
remanded and later consolidated and certified as a class action, and finally that in one of these 
consolidated cases, motions based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and ATS  
that challenged a default judgment against Marcos-Manotoc were denied in 1992). 
 38. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation (Marcos I), 978 F.2d 493, 
500 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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of jus cogens,39 does invoke subject-matter jurisdiction under the 
ATS.40  In a later appeal of the consolidated cases, the Ninth Circuit 
reiterated that “[a]ctionable violations of international law must be of 
a norm that is specific, universal and obligatory,” and that torture 
satisfies this standard.41 
In Kadić v. Karadžić, a suit alleging various atrocities including 
genocide, torture, and summary execution, the Second Circuit’s 
finding of jurisdiction under the ATS was supported, as in Filártiga, 
by the Executive Branch.42  The defendant Karadžić was the leader of 
“Srpska,” a self-proclaimed, though unrecognized, republic within the 
territory of Bosnia, after the break up of Yugoslavia.  In its opinion, 
the court states that “[t]he Executive Branch has emphatically 
restated in this litigation its position that private persons may be 
found liable under the Alien Tort Act for acts of genocide, war 
crimes, and other violations of international humanitarian law.”43  It 
also recognizes that, per the Executive Branch’s statements, there is 
no conflict with the political branches in adjudicating the plaintiff’s 
claims in this case.44  Quoting the Government’s Statement of 
Interest, the court acknowledges that though ATS claims may invoke 
political questions that would preclude their justiciability, this claim 
does not.45  However, the court also points out that “even an assertion 
of the political question doctrine by the Executive Branch, entitled to 
respectful consideration, would not necessarily preclude 
adjudication.”46 
The Supreme Court finally addressed the Alien Tort Statute in 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.47  The story of Alvarez-Machain began in 
Mexico in 1985 with the torture and murder of Enrique Camarena-
 
 39. Jus cogens is “[a] mandatory or peremptory norm of general international law accepted 
and recognized by the international community as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (8th ed. 2004). 
 40. Marcos I, 978 F.2d at 503 (The plaintiff’s “suit as an alien against Marcos-Manotoc for 
having caused the wrongful death of her son, by official torture in violation of a jus cogens norm 
of international law, properly invokes the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts under 
§ 1350.”). 
 41. Marcos II, 25 F.3d at 1475. 
 42. 70 F.3d 232, 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 43. Id. at 239-40. 
 44. See id. at 250. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004). 
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Salazar, an agent for the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).48  The 
DEA claimed that Alvarez-Machain, a doctor in Mexico, prolonged 
the agent’s life so that his abductors could interrogate and torture 
him.49  After negotiations with Mexican officials failed to produce 
Alvarez-Machain for trial in the United States, the DEA offered 
payment for the doctor’s kidnapping.50  He was, thereafter, abducted 
by Jose Francisco Sosa, among others, in Guadalajara, taken to a 
motel, held overnight, and finally handed to federal agents in El Paso, 
Texas.51  Alvarez-Machain initially challenged his arrest claiming both 
outrageous government conduct and lack of jurisdiction because the 
government violated the extradition treaty with Mexico.52  In United 
States v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court found against Alvarez-
Machain on both issues;53 however, upon proceeding to trial in 1992, 
the doctor was ultimately acquitted.54 
In 1993, Alvarez-Machain began an action under the Alien Tort 
Statute, claiming arbitrary detention in violation of the law of nations.  
The Court granted certiorari and in 2004 issued its decision finding 
that § 1350 was a jurisdictional statute that in itself granted no cause 
of action.55  However, the Court made clear that the statute’s passage 
and legislative history imply that it was intended to have some 
practical effect; namely, it provides jurisdiction over certain 
recognizable, though limited, common law principles that arise out of 
customary international law.56  The Court notes three violations of the 
law of nations at the time the ATS was drafted that set the standard 
for recognizable violations of customary international law today: 
 
 48. Id.; United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992). 
 49. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697; Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 657. 
 50. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 657 n.2. 
 51. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 712. 
 56. Id. at 724-25.  In his concurrence, Justice Scalia, too, argues that because the ATS is 
purely jurisdictional and because there is no exception here to Erie’s “fundamental holding that 
a general common law does not exist,” an act of Congress is necessary to create a cause of action 
in cases invoking the jurisdiction of the ATS.  Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in 
original).  Thus, by inviting the courts to use their discretion, though with appropriate restraint, 
Justice Scalia admonishes Justice Souter’s majority opinion, stating: 
In today’s latest victory for its Never Say Never Jurisprudence, the Court ignores its 
own conclusion that the ATS provides only jurisdiction, wags its finger at the lower 
courts for going too far, and then—repeating the same formula the ambitious lower 
courts themselves used—invites them to try again. 
Id. at 750 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
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offences against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and piracy.57  
Though adamant in its opinion that courts apply a high degree of 
judicial caution in recognizing international norms as enforceable 
international law under § 1350, the Court does affirm the reasoning in 
Filártiga, finding that torture is a violation of an “international law 
norm with [as] definite content and acceptance among civilized 
nations [as] the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was 
enacted.”58 
With regard to Alvarez-Machain’s claims, the Court ultimately 
found that detention for such a short period of time did not meet 
these strict requirements.59  This decision, regardless, flew in the face 
of the Executive Branch’s insistence that the Alien Tort Statute 
requires a separate act of Congress to establish a cause of action 
under which it can be invoked.60  The Justice Department had clearly 
stated regarding this litigation: “Just as Section 1350 does not itself 
create a cause of action, a cause of action is not supplied by the 
instruments of international law relied on by the Ninth Circuit or, 
more generally, by some sort of federal-common-law theory.”61  The 
Court, though, far from rejects the importance of deference in 
handling cases that touch on foreign relations.  Citing In re South 
African Apartheid Litigation,62 a case that South Africa claimed, and 
the United States Department of State agreed, would “interfere with 
the policy embodied by its Truth and Reconciliation Commission,”63 
the Court notes that “there is a strong argument that federal courts 
should give serious weight to the Executive Branch’s view of the 
case’s impact on foreign policy.”64 
 
 57. Id. at 720. 
 58. See id. at 732. 
 59. Id. at 738. 
 60. See Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2003/ 
3mer/2mer/2003-0339.mer.aa.html. 
 61. Id. at 24; see Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 4, Doe v. 
Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/05/doj050803.pdf (“The ATS, which is a simple grant of 
jurisdiction, cannot properly be construed as a broad grant of authority for courts to decipher 
and enforce their own concepts of international law.”). 
 62. 238 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 63. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was created to deal with the injustice that 
occurred under apartheid in South Africa.  Information on the Committee is available at The 
Official Truth and Reconciliation Commission Website, http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/ (last visited 
March 30, 2007). 
 64. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21. 
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II.  EXECUTIVE DEFERENCE IN RELATION TO FOREIGN 
RELATIONS: ALTMANN AND BEYOND 
A few weeks before issuing its Sosa decision, the Supreme Court 
issued a decision in a case arising under a different, yet closely 
related, statute, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).  
Republic of Austria v. Altmann involved a claim by Maria Altmann, 
the niece and sole surviving heir of Jewish Czechoslovakian art 
collector Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, for six Gustav Klimt paintings that 
had been seized by the Nazis in World War II and that had ended up 
in a museum in Austria.65  Altmann claimed jurisdiction in the federal 
courts under the FSIA; however, the FSIA was not passed until 1978, 
years after the alleged wrong.66  The Court granted certiorari to 
address the question of whether or not the FSIA applied 
retroactively.67 
The FSIA “grants foreign states immunity from the jurisdiction 
of federal and state courts but expressly exempts certain cases,” 
including expropriation cases.68  A codification of a restrictive theory 
of immunity, the Act gives the courts “primary responsibility” in 
determining whether to grant immunity.69  In Altmann, the Court held 
that the FSIA does apply to pre-enactment conduct. 
The Court also makes an important comment with respect to 
executive deference.  Though the Executive Branch had contended 
that the FSIA does not apply to pre-enactment conduct, the Court 
finds that this was “a ‘pure question of statutory construction . . . well 
within the province of the Judiciary.’”70  However, the Court clarifies 
that “should the State Department choose to express its opinion on 
the implications of exercising jurisdiction over particular petitioners 
in connection with their alleged conduct, that opinion might well be 
entitled to deference as the considered judgment of the Executive on 
a particular question of foreign policy.”71 
Upon post-Altmann remand, in Whiteman v. Dorotheum GmbH 
& Co KG, the Second Circuit expanded on these Supreme Court 
statements regarding deference in the immunity context.72  Looking at 
 
 65. 541 U.S. 677, 680-84 (2004). 
 66. Id. at 685. 
 67. Id. at 681. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 691. 
 70. Id. at 701 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446, 448 (1987)). 
 71. Id. at 702 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). 
 72. 431 F.3d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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a class action suit against Austria, arising “from sweeping 
confiscations of property that were part of the systematic Nazi 
victimization of Austrian Jews between 1938 and 1945,” the court 
sought to answer the question of how much deference should be 
given the Executive Branch.73  In dismissing the case as non-
justiciable under the political question standards of Baker v. Carr,74 
the court notes three reasons for affording deference on this 
“particular” question: 
(1) the Executive Branch has exercised its authority to enter into 
executive agreements respecting the resolution of the claims in 
question; (2) the United States Government (a) has established 
through an executive agreement an alternative international forum 
for considering the claims in question, and (b) has indicated to this 
Court that, as a matter of foreign policy, the alternative forum is 
superior to litigation; and (3) the United States foreign policy 
advanced by the executive agreement is substantially undermined 
by the continuing pendency of this case.75 
It clearly notes, though, the narrowness of its holding given the 
interests of the Executive and the facts of the case and cites Sosa for 
the importance of case-specific deference.76 
The Eleventh Circuit, also had occasion to address deference 
with regard to claims arising out of the Nazi policy of expropriating 
Jewish property.  In Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, the court 
looked at the question of justiciability in cases affecting foreign policy 
and found that, “although the executive’s statement of interest is 
entitled to deference, it does not make the litigation non-
justiciable.”77  It ultimately did find, however, that deference is 
appropriate when analyzing whether the case should be dismissed due 
 
 73. Id.  
 74. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).  The Baker court stated: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found [1] a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination 
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s 
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question.. 
Id.  In Whiteman, the court finds the case nonjusticiable under the fourth standard, “the 
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the 
respect due coordinate branches of government.” Whiteman, 431 F.3d at 72. 
 75. Whiteman, 431 F.3d at 74. 
 76. Id. 
 77. 379 F.3d 1227, 1236 n.12 (11th Cir. 2004).   
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to international comity considerations.78  Because of the government’s 
agreement with Germany and establishment of a foundation to 
handle claims such as the plaintiff’s, the court found that “based on 
the strength of our government’s interests in using the Foundation, 
the strength of the German government’s interests, and the adequacy 
of the Foundation as an alternative forum,” it was appropriate for it 
to abstain from adjudicating the case.79 
Finally, in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC., an ATS case involving war 
crimes, environmental devastation, racial discrimination, and 
violations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) related to mining operations that led to a ten year civil 
war in Papua New Guinea, the Ninth Circuit addressed the question 
of Executive deference in the context of the political question 
doctrine, the act of state doctrine, and international comity.80  It held 
that despite the Executive’s Statement of Interest (SOI) seeking 
dismissal of the case, the district court erred in finding the claims non-
justiciable.81 
Looking first at the political question doctrine, it found that “it is 
[the court’s] responsibility to determine whether a political question 
is present, rather than to dismiss on that ground simply because the 
Executive Branch expresses some hesitancy about a case 
proceeding.”82  The court’s opinion looks closely at the six Baker 
factors.83  It determines that because, absent the State Department’s 
Statement of Interest, this case would not evoke political question 
concerns, “the SOI must carry the primary burden of establishing a 
political question.”84  It thus concludes that despite the SOI, there is 
no political question due to three considerations: 
[1] The State Department explicitly did not request that [the court] 
dismiss this suit on political question grounds, and [the court is] 
confident that proceeding does not express any disrespect for the 
executive, even if it would prefer that the suit disappear. [2] Nor 
 
 78. Id. at 1238-39. 
 79. Id. at 1239. 
 80. 456 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006). On April 12, 2007 the 9th Circuit granted Rio 
Tinto’s petition for rehearing en banc withdrawing this opinion, Sarei v. Rio Tinto, No. 02-
56256, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 8387, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2007), and re-issuing this opinion, 
unchanged, as an en banc opinion, Sarei v. Rio Tinto, No. 02-56256, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
8430, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2007). 
 81. Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1074. 
 82. Id. at 1081. 
 83. See supra note 74 (listing the six factors). 
 84. Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1082. 
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do[es] [the court] see any “unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence” to the SOI’s nonspecific invocations of risks to the 
peace process. [3] And finally, given the guarded nature of the SOI, 
[the court] see[s] no “embarrassment” that would follow from 
fulfilling [the court’s] independent duty to determine whether the 
case should proceed.85 
The court also notes the possibility, argued by plaintiffs, of a political 
shift in Papau New Guinea that would undercut the four-year-old 
letter from the State Department.86 
Next, the Ninth Circuit addressed the role of Executive 
deference with regard to the act of state doctrine.87  Addressing first 
the racial discrimination claim, the court found that this is a violation 
of jus cogens and, therefore, not an official sovereign act.88  As the act 
of state doctrine requires an official sovereign act, the court 
concluded that the claim cannot be barred by it.  With regard to the 
claims arising under the UNCLOS, the court found that its discussion 
of the SOI in the political question context is relevant, though not 
dispositive, to the act of state analysis.  The court stated, “A 
consideration of foreign policy concerns is one of several Sabbatino 
factors, and the SOI’s foreign policy concerns are entitled to 
consideration, but only as one part of that analysis.”89  The court then 
vacated the district court’s decision, remanding for further 
 
 85. Id. (citing the fourth, fifth and sixth Baker factors, supra note 74).  The court also notes 
that this conclusion is consistent with its holding in Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532 (9th 
Cir. 2005), which dismissed ATS claims under the political question doctrine.  The court stated: 
“We do not understand Vatican Bank as foreclosing the plaintiffs’ claims that relate to the PNG 
regime’s alleged war crimes, but instead read its holding to apply only to the narrower category 
of war crimes committed by enemies of the United States.”  Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1084.  The Ninth 
Circuit, thus, avoids a circuit split with the Second Circuit’s decision in Kadić.  Id. 
 86. Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1083 n.13. 
 87. The act of state doctrine of justiciability “prevents U.S. courts from inquiring into the 
validity of the public acts of a recognized sovereign power committed within its own territory.”  
Id.  at 1084 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964)).  The act of 
state doctrine is invoked whenever a court’s decision would invalidate an official act taken by a 
foreign state.  Id.  (citing W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404 
(1990)). 
 88. Id. at 1085. 
 89. Id. at 1086.  The Sabbatino factors noted by the Supreme Court are: 
[1] [T]he greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area 
of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions 
regarding it . . . . [2] [T]he less important the implications of an issue are for our foreign 
relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political branches.[3] The 
balance of relevant considerations may also be shifted if the government which 
perpetrated the challenged act of state is no longer in existence. 
Id. at 1084 (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428). 
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consideration given its SOI analysis.90  Finally, the court conducted a 
similar analysis under the comity doctrine, again sending the case 
back to the district court for consideration consistent with its political 
question SOI discussion.91   
As these cases illustrate, what amounts to giving “serious weight” 
to the Executive’s “considered judgments” in private actions against 
foreign parties is far from clear.  If the Executive makes a statement 
alleging the “particular” foreign policy implications of a “particular” 
judgment involving the “particular” parties in a case, does “serious 
weight” require instant dismissal of the case?  How “particular” must 
the Executive be?  How much latitude does “serious weight” afford 
the courts?  Further, the courts’ opinions above have applied 
executive deference to justiciability doctrines such as political 
question, act of state, and international comity.  What is the 
relationship between deference and these doctrines in ATS human 
rights litigation? 
III.  THE ATS AND CLAIMS  
OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN CHINA 
The cases arising out of human rights abuses in China reflect the 
importance of answering these questions.  The Southern District of 
New York, the Seventh Circuit, and the Northern District of 
California have all ruled on ATS actions involving Chinese officials.  
The Southern District of New York and Seventh Circuit, however, 
did not reach the merits.  In Zhou v. Peng, an ATS claim was brought 
against Li Peng, the Premier of China at the time of the human rights 
abuses that stemmed from the Tiananmen Square protests in Beijing 
in 1989.92  Though initially finding that process had been properly 
served on Peng through the State Department security detail 
protecting him, the Southern District vacated that judgment on 
August 30, 2003, upon receiving a motion by the Government to 
vacate on the grounds that the order effectuating service of process 
on Peng required that the State Department official deliver the 
papers to Peng.93  Thus the order violates the U.S. Government’s 
 
 90. Id. at 1086. 
 91. Id. at 1088. International comity, the court explains, suggests that courts “defer to the 
laws or interests of a foreign country and decline to exercise jurisdiction that is otherwise 
properly asserted.”  Id. at 1086. 
 92. 286 F. Supp. 2d 255, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 93. See id. 
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sovereign immunity by requiring the federal official to act.94  In Ye v. 
Zemin, the Seventh Circuit found that a suit by Falun Gong adherents 
against former People’s Republic of China president Jiang Zemin was 
barred by head of state immunity.95  Heads of state, the court held, 
were not covered by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and, 
therefore, determination of head of state immunity still belonged to 
the Executive Branch.96  Unquestionable deference was required. 97 
The widespread persecution of the Falun Gong, a massive 
Chinese spiritual movement, began on July 22, 1999 when it was 
officially outlawed as an “evil cult” by the Chinese government under 
President Zemin.  Due to the size of the movement, it has been 
perceived by the government as a threat to the Communist Party’s 
control.98  On July 21, 2005, Gretchen Birkle, Acting Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary at the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor at the U.S. State Department, noted that since 1999 more than 
100,000 Falun Gong adherents and sympathizers have been 
detained.99  Amnesty International reports that “[m]ost of those 
detained were assigned to periods of ‘Re-education through Labour’ 
without charge or trial, during which they were at high risk of torture 
or ill-treatment, particularly if they refused to renounce their 
beliefs.”100  The State Department’s 2005 Country Report on Human 
Rights Practices stated that “[s]ince the crackdown on Falun Gong 
began in 1999, estimates of Falun Gong adherents who died in 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 96. Id. at 625. 
 97. See id. at 626 (“The obligation of the Judicial Branch is clear—a determination by the 
Executive Branch that a foreign head of state is immune from suit is conclusive and a court must 
accept such a determination without reference to the underlying claims of a plaintiff.”). 
 98. Mark J. Leavy, Note, Discrediting Human Rights Abuse as an “Act of State”: A Case 
Study on the Repression of the Falun Gong in China and Commentary on International Human 
Rights Law in U.S. Courts, 35 RUTGERS L. J. 749, 757 (2004); see Falun Gong and China’s 
Continuing War on Human Rights: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Afr., Global Human 
Rights and Int’l Operations and the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the H. Comm. 
on Int’l Relations, 109th Cong. 13 (2005) (statement of Gretchen Birkle, Acting Principal 
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. 
Department of State) (“[The Chinese Communist Party leaders] proclaim stability and social 
order as a top priority, often at the expense of basic human rights and freedom, as a means to 
perpetuate the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.”), available at 
http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/22579.pdf. 
 99. Birkle, supra note 98, at 14. 
 100. AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2005: THE STATE OF THE 
WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS 78 (2005), available at http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/chn-
summary-eng. 
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custody due to torture, abuse, and neglect ranged from several 
hundred to a few thousand.”101 
On December 8, 2004, in the case Doe v. Liu Qi, the Northern 
District of California granted default declaratory judgment in favor of 
the Falun Gong plaintiffs.102  Though this has been seen by supporters 
of the Falun Gong ATS cases as a hopeful precedent,103 the Northern 
District of California proceeded cautiously in its Liu decision denying 
both injunctive and monetary relief.104  Ultimately it found that the act 
of state doctrine, due primarily to the State Department’s concerns 
voiced in its Statement of Interest, precludes granting any relief 
except declaratory relief for the plaintiffs’ specific substantive claims 
and deemed adjudication of plaintiffs’ claims regarding the general 
conduct of the Chinese government inappropriate.105 
Currently, another Falun Gong case is pending in the District 
Court for the District of Columbia.  Li v. Bo presents allegations very 
similar to those in Liu, including torture, genocide, deprivation of the 
right to life, arbitrary detention, and deprivation of freedom of 
religion.106  The notable difference between the cases is the reason for 
each defendant’s presence in the United States, which enabled them 
to be served.  Bo Xilia, former Governor of the Liao Ning Province 
and current Minister of Commerce of the PRC, was served on April 
22, 2004 while on special diplomatic mission “pursuant to an 
invitation of the Executive Branch to participate in an annual meeting 
of the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade.”107  
Consequently, it is because of the official nature of Bo’s presence in 
the United States that the Executive Branch has urged the D.C. 
District Court to dismiss the claims.108  Plaintiffs, however, insist this 
case is justiciable for three reasons.  First, Bo Xilai is not subject to 
any cognizable immunity.  Second, neither sovereign immunity nor 
act of state bars this action because torture and genocide can never be 
 
 101. U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (2006), 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61605.htm. 
 102. 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1306 (N.D. Cal. 2004).  On December 8, 2004, the Honorable 
Judge Wilken adopted the October 28, 2004 Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge 
Chen. 
 103. See Schwartz, supra note 7. 
 104. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1266. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See Class Action Complaint at 16-23, Li v. Bo, No. 04-0649 (D.D.C. June 30, 2004). 
 107. Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest of the United States at 2, Li v. Bo, 
No. 04-0649 (D.D.C. July 24, 2006). 
 108. Id. at 1. 
04__CLARENS.DOC 10/4/2007  9:53:56 AM 
2007] DEFERENCE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 431 
legally justified actions of a state.  Third, foreign policy considerations 
do not apply as there is a clear legal standard that the court can 
apply.109 
IV.  DEFERENCE TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: 
ESTABLISHING A PRACTICAL STANDARD 
Li v. Bo illustrates the complexity of the question of judicial 
involvement in litigation, particularly Alien Tort Statute litigation, 
affecting foreign governments.  It has been argued that the courts 
have no place in international human rights litigation.  Surely, though, 
various factors place this type of litigation within the competency of 
the courts, and further, the courts have made it clear that they are not 
about to defer without good reason.  The doctrines of justiciability 
including immunity, act of state, political question, and international 
comity foreclose the adjudication of many claims.  Further, post-Sosa, 
the courts have mandated a very narrow scope of discretion for 
themselves in identifying causes of action under the ATS.110  On the 
other hand, in 1992 Congress, instead of muting the influence of the 
ATS, affirmed its importance, particularly with regard to torture and 
extrajudicial killing, through the Torture Victims Protection Act.111  
Ultimately, the limited scope of human rights litigation with its well-
defined doctrines of justiciability, its Supreme Court guidance, and its 
Congressional approval argue for, rather than against, its 
adjudication.  Regardless, in many situations deference to the 
Executive as “the sole organ of the nation” is advisable and, indeed, 
necessary.  The challenge for the courts is in deciding when to defer.  
In light of the cases above, the compelling nature of the human rights 
claims, the interest of the Executive Branch, and need for uniformity, 
deference must be based on a legally cognizable principle: namely, 
the specific and foreseeable costs of the litigation to the Executive’s 
administration of foreign policy.  The benefits of such a standard are 
far-reaching.  First, it is practical and consistent with the mandates of 
the Supreme Court and Congress.  It also explains many of the lower 
court decisions and brings uniformity to their reasoning.  Second, it 
addresses many of the concerns on both sides on the deference 
 
 109. See Response to the Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest of the United 
States, Li v. Bo, No. 04-0649 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2006). 
 110. The question of what causes of action are recognizable under Sosa is outside the scope 
of this Note.  For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to recognize that torture and other 
such gross violations of human rights pass the Sosa test. 
 111. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
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debate: it minimizes many of the inherent costs of international 
human rights litigation, it balances the rights of individual plaintiffs 
with the compelling concerns of the Executive Branch, and finally, it 
maintains the independence of the judicial system. 
A. Examining a Test for Deference: A Practical Standard 
Comparing the Statements of Interest in the Liu and Bo cases 
best illustrates the application of a test focusing on specific and 
foreseeable costs of litigation to the Executive’s administration of 
foreign affairs.  In Li v. Bo, the Department of State urged the D.C. 
District Court to dismiss the case on the grounds that Minister Bo had 
been invited by the Executive to Washington and that it was pursuant 
to that invitation that he was in the United States and able to be 
served.  The Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest of the 
United States notes the possible ramifications of allowing this case to 
proceed, such as the negative effects this may have on future 
invitations extended to foreign, particularly Chinese, officials.  It 
states, 
The prospect that senior foreign officials who are in the United 
States for government-to-government business may be served with 
process in a civil suit poses a severe impediment to the conduct of 
foreign relations.  Its effect is to deprive the President of an 
essential foreign policy tool—the ability to host meetings without 
fear of harassment or, ultimately, to host meetings at all.112 
This is a specific and foreseeable cost to the Executive’s 
administration of foreign affairs. 
Conversely, in Doe v. Liu, the State Department focuses on the 
act of state doctrine and vague references to possible impacts the 
litigation can have on U.S. relations with China.113  In urging the court 
to find the case non-justiciable, the State Department cites “the 
potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences that such 
litigation can generate.”114  There are no foreseeable costs that the 
Executive pointed to with any specificity.115  Further, both reasons the 
State Department gives for dismissing the action, foreign sovereign 
 
 112. Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Intent of the United States, supra note 107, 
at 13. 
 113. Statement of Interest of the United States, Doe v. Liu, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 
2004) (No. 02 Civ. 672) (attaching letter from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, Department 
of State, to Honorable Robert D. McCallum, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, 
United States Department of Justice (Sept. 25, 2002)). 
 114. Id. (emphasis added). 
 115. See generally id. 
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immunity and the act of state doctrine, have been repudiated by 
subsequent litigation as possible means for dismissal.116  Thus, the 
Executive has given no reason to abstain from adjudicating the case. 
Ultimately it is likely that this standard will lead to the dismissal 
of cases via the political question or international comity doctrines.  
Once a cognizable cost to the Executive has been identified, the 
continued litigation of a particular case would likely fall within the 
fourth, fifth, or sixth Baker standard of non-justiciability: namely, “[4] 
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question.”117  For instance in Li v. Bo, there is a 
clear lack of respect for the President’s decision to invite certain 
ministers if those ministers are subject to being served with a civil suit 
upon entering the country.118  Likewise, in the case of In re: South 
African Apartheid Litigation, comity concerns regarding the 
usurpation of South Africa’s efforts to deal with its troubled past 
illustrate a specific and foreseeable cost to adjudicating those 
claims.119  The specific and foreseeable conflict with the Truth and 
Rehabilitation program mandates deference to the Executive’s call 
for an end to the litigation.  Naturally a handful of cases may arise 
where the Executive announces a specific and foreseeable cost and 
yet that consideration does not place the case squarely in either of 
these doctrines.  In such cases, separation of powers is sufficient 
grounds for dismissal.  It would simply be improper to proceed with 
such a case. 
This standard is also consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Sosa and Altmann.  It asks the courts to look, on a case-
 
 116. As explained in Part II of this Note, the Ninth Circuit held in Sarei that the 
adjudication of violations of jus cogens do not fall into the province of the act of state doctrine, 
thus, given the district court’s opinion in Liu, the case will possibly be reversed given the new 
precedent.  Interestingly, in its Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest in the Bo 
Xilai litigation, the State Department urges the Court not to undertake a sovereign immunity or 
act of state analysis, as both doctrines require official actions and the State Department would 
like to avoid implicating the PRC in egregious official action. 
 117. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 216, 217 (1962). 
 118. See Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Intent of the United States, supra note 
107, at 4-11. 
 119. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.692, 733 n.21 (2004). 
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by-case basis, at the particular concerns of the Executive.120  It also 
limits the issues on which the courts would defer, maintaining the 
ability to interpret statutes and adjudicate private claims in the 
judiciary, while deferring to the Executive’s knowledge on what the 
ramifications of litigation may be. 
With regard to the allegations of torture and extrajudicial killing, 
striking this balance is also consistent with the will of the Congress.  
In 1992, Congress passed the Torture Victims Protection Act 
(TVPA).121  The purpose of the act was “to provide a Federal cause of 
action against any individual who, under actual or apparent authority, 
or color of law, of any foreign nation, subjects any individual to 
torture or extrajudicial killing.”122  In this way, Congress has 
sanctioned this type of litigation.  Universal deference would, 
therefore, be inappropriate.  As Justice Jackson noted in the 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, “When the President takes 
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only 
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers 
of Congress over the matter.”123  The President’s constitutional 
powers in the realm of foreign relations are great and, with good 
reason, can trump the other branches, but it is unquestionable that 
Congress, through statute, can create causes of action enforceable in 
federal courts. 
Further, the courts have, in effect, been using this standard in the 
cases preceding Sosa and Altmann.  In Whiteman and Ungaro-
Benages the courts were ultimately looking at the specificity and 
foreseeability of the Executive’s concerns.124  In both cases, the claims 
were dismissed because of the specific and foreseeable cost to the 
Executive’s administration of Nazi expropriation claims.  
Accordingly, in Sarei, the Ninth Circuit viewed the Statement of 
Interest’s “nonspecific invocations of risks to the peace process,” as 
not sufficient to require the court’s deference.125 
 
 120. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 702 (2004) (stating that deference 
should be given to “the considered judgment of the Executive on a particular question of 
foreign policy”). 
 121. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
 122. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 2 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 84. 
 123. 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 124. See Whiteman v. Dorotheum GmbH & Co KG, 431 F.3d 57, 59-60 (2d Cir. 2005); see 
Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 125. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC., 456 F.3d 1069, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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B. Addressing the Concerns in the Deference Debate 
Human rights litigation under the ATS has spurred strong 
sentiments from both its advocates and its critics.  A quick search on 
LexisNexis or Westlaw reveals hundreds of articles published since 
the Second Circuit’s decision in Filártiga either condemning the 
litigation as an unconstitutional or inappropriate use of judicial 
power, or praising it as “rais[ing] the voices of the oppressed, and at 
the same time . . . remind[ing] those responsible for carrying out 
human rights abuses that they no longer operate with impunity.”126  
Consequently, scholars in the field have voiced various concerns with 
both adjudicating these cases and abstaining from such adjudication.  
By establishing a cognizable test focusing on the specific and 
foreseeable costs of litigation, many of these concerns are, if not 
negated, diminished: “Gratuitous tensions with other nations should 
certainly be avoided[, b]ut sometimes tensions are not gratuitous[.]”127 
1. Minimizing the Inherent Costs of International Human Rights 
Litigation.  In an article published in the Chicago Journal of 
International Law in 2001, Professor Curtis Bradley outlined three 
major costs associated with international human rights litigation: costs 
to foreign relations, costs to democracy, and costs to the international 
system.128  As Bradley notes, however, “these costs would not be 
worthy of serious concern if we could be assured that this litigation 
would be contained within narrow bounds.”129  By defining a legally 
cognizable test to determine when a court should defer to the 
Executive in human rights cases, such a limitation would be assured.  
Further, the test focuses on addressing the specific and foreseeable 
costs of litigation, thus by its nature minimizing those very costs. 
For instance, Bradley notes the costs to the international system 
of allowing service of process to be effected on those traveling to the 
U.N. headquarters in New York.130  Clearly, as in the case of Li v. Bo, 
there is a specific and foreseeable cost to allowing such litigation to 
 
 126. Mark Gibney, U.S. Courts and the Selective Protection of Human Rights, in JUDICIAL 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: MYTH OR REALITY? 177, 179 (Mark Gibney & Stanislaw 
Frankowski eds., 1999). 
 127. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law 11 (Univ. of 
Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 128, 2006), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/128.pdf. 
 128. Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 457, 460 (2001). 
 129. Id. at 470. 
 130. Id. at 469-70. 
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proceed.  Thus, should the Executive Branch raise that issue, the 
court would find just cause to defer to its judgment. 
This raises another concern relating to the costs of ATS litigation 
to foreign relations: namely the burden on the Executive of having to 
“stake[] out positions that it might wish to leave ambiguous or 
unarticulated.”131  Without succumbing to universal deference, setting 
narrow and transparent criteria for deference would set clear 
guidelines on what the Executive would need to assert to convince a 
court.  This minimizes the Executive’s burden in two ways.  First, if 
there is no specific and foreseeable reason for the court to defer, the 
Executive Branch is not in a position where it has to articulate its 
general position on a matter in effort to convince a judge.  Second, 
this transparency would extend to foreign governments observing this 
process, thereby making it less awkward for the Executive Branch. 
2. Balancing the Rights of Individual Plaintiffs with the 
Compelling Concerns of the Executive Branch.  It has been argued 
that the cases alleging human rights violations in China “interfere 
with . . . political balancing” of U.S.-China relations, particularly 
balancing of economic matters with the United States’ disapproval of 
China’s human rights record.132  Though this concern carries great 
weight, particularly in light of Chinese complaints that this litigation 
“adversely affect[s]” U.S.-China relations,133 it must be remembered 
that “[o]fficial China is not so uncomprehending of the United States 
system of separation of powers as it claims to be.”134  Understanding 
these two points illustrates how a uniform and transparent standard 
will satisfy many concerns regarding fears of the judiciary stepping on 
the Executive’s toes.  More deference would only serve to deny 
individuals the right to appeal to the judicial system for relief under 
the laws of the United States.135  Vague concern that these cases will 
actually affect U.S.-China relationships is not sufficient to usurp 
judicial power.  On the other hand, specific and foreseeable costs such 
as a threat to our ability to host meetings of Chinese officials without 
embarrassing harassment would be sufficient to require respectful 
deference.  Further, plaintiffs would be aware that serving an official 
here on a diplomatic mission would only lead to dismissal, thus, it 
 
 131. DeLisle, supra note 7, at 488. 
 132. Bradley, supra note 128, at 461. 
 133. Schwartz, supra note 7. 
 134. DeLisle, supra note 7, at 491-92. 
 135. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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would make it less likely they would attempt to serve such ministers 
again. 
In Filártiga, the court concluded its opinion stating, “In the 
modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations have 
combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize that respect 
for fundamental human rights is in their individual and collective 
interest.  Among the rights universally proclaimed by all nations . . . is 
the right to be free of physical torture.”136  As Congress understood, 
“[t]hese universal principals provide scant comfort, however, to the 
many thousands of victims of torture and summary executions around 
the world.”137  The ATS and TVPA allow victims of some of the most 
heinous crimes to seek relief when, in most cases, none is available 
elsewhere.  Though it is argued that no real relief can be granted to 
these victims by the courts because of the difficulty in enforcing and 
collecting monetary damages in ATS litigation,138 plaintiffs in these 
suits beg to differ.  After the Second Circuit’s decision in Kadić, for 
instance, one of the plaintiffs noted that the case “was not about 
monetary damages, but about gaining recognition of the acts 
committed by Bosnian Serb ultra-nationalists.”139 
Despite the noble cause of adjudicating torture and other gross 
violations of human rights, there are times such adjudication imposes 
real costs on the Executive’s exercise of foreign relations.  It was for 
this reason that the Altmann Court mandated “deference [to] the 
considered judgment of the Executive on a particular question of 
foreign policy.”140  By requiring a specific and foreseeable cost to the 
Executive, the rule for deference would ensure a plaintiff’s day in 
court while ensuring the Executive’s ability to protect real interests of 
the nation with regard to foreign relations. 
3. Maintaining the Independence of the Judicial System.  Finally, 
establishing a practical standard for executive deference ensures a 
higher level of judicial independence.  Surely, the defense of human 
rights is a political issue.  Different administrations have given human 
rights varying degrees of priority.  When Filártiga was being decided, 
President Jimmy Carter had made human rights his utmost priority.  
 
 136. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 867, 890 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 137. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, supra note 122, at 3. 
 138. Bradley, supra note 128, at 458-59. 
 139. CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 546 (4th ed. 2006). 
 140. Republic of Austria v Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 702 (2004). 
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In December 1978, he said, “Human rights is the soul of our foreign 
policy.  And I say this with assurance, because human rights is the 
soul of our sense of nationhood.”141  Alternatively, President Bush has 
focused his foreign policy on national security and fighting the war on 
terror.  As noted above, amongst the costs of human rights litigation 
is the cost to democracy.  For better or worse, the course of our 
current foreign policy was decided by an election.  Thus, ATS 
litigation can be seen as amounting to “plaintiffs’ diplomacy,”142 and 
thereby usurping the democratic process. 
At the same time, however, it runs contrary to the separation of 
powers to therefore assert that the Executive should have the ability 
to determine what cases the courts can and cannot adjudicate.  As 
Justice Powell noted in his concurring opinion in First National City 
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, “I would be uncomfortable with a 
doctrine which would require the judiciary to receive the Executive’s 
permission before invoking its jurisdiction.  Such a notion, in the 
name of the doctrine of separation of powers, seems to me to conflict 
with that very doctrine.”143 
In her 2004 article published in the Harvard Human Rights 
Journal, Professor Beth Stephens questions the motivations behind 
the Bush Administration’s involvement in recent ATS litigation and 
recommends caution in deferring to its foreign policy concerns.144  She 
notes that her position “is not to suggest that the courts second-guess 
the wisdom of a particular foreign policy, a task clearly assigned to 
the executive branch.  But the courts should review the evidence as to 
the substance of that policy and assess whether the evidence . . . 
supports the results it requests.” 145 
Again, a legal standard based on the specificity and foreseeability 
of the cost to the Executive’s administration of foreign policy 
 
 141. Jimmy Carter, U.S. President, The U.S. Commitment: Human Rights and Foreign 
Policy (Dec. 1978), excerpts available at http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/hrintro/carter.htm. 
 142. Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 
and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2241, 
2243 (2004) (“The broadest critiques of the ATS have been that the private litigation of human 
rights violations complicates the war on terrorism, that it amounts to ‘plaintiffs’ diplomacy’ by 
interfering with executive branch prerogatives in foreign affairs.”). 
 143. 406 U.S. 759, 773 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 144. Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration’s Efforts to 
Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169, 182 (2004) (arguing that the Bush 
Administration’s legal stance on recent ATS litigation “mask an interest in shielding favored 
defendants from accountability for egregious human rights abuses”). 
 145. Id. at 195. 
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addresses these concerns.  It allows the courts to adjudicate cases 
based on a clear legal standard and precludes the Administration 
from using its position to stop the litigation of cases it simply does not 
like. 
CONCLUSION 
As ATS litigation expands and cases are filed throughout the 
country, American jurisprudence, as it has so many times in our 
history, calls for uniformity.  The potential for abuse of both 
executive power and plaintiff power demand a definite standard 
courts can use in addressing executive deference.  Such a standard 
would allow the judiciary to balance the need for justice in individual 
cases with the specific and foreseeable concerns of the Executive.  It 
adds transparency to the decision-making process which benefits both 
the domestic and international players in ATS disputes.  Finally, it 
upholds our system of separation of powers in the face of two 
compelling and competing forces: international diplomacy on the one 
hand and domestic jurisprudence on the other. 
